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This paper analyzes a contract between farmers and a large company in the Danish food 
industry, Danisco Foods. Production of green peas requires a very accurate coordina-
tion, which is obtained through centralized decision-making. The contract is based on a 
tournament system providing risk sharing between the farmers. General problems from 
the contract theory such as hold up, moral hazard, risk sharing and screening are ana-
lyzed. The paper illustrates the tradeoffs between these problems in design of contracts. 
By negotiating the contract through a pea-growers association, the farmers gain some 
bargaining power. Thus the farmers can ensure that Danisco Foods uses only one con-
tract for all farmers. This paper analyzes the consequences of the farmers’ strategy. 
Throughout the analysis several modifications of the contract is suggested in order to 
improve the incentives. 
 
Keywords: contract theory, coordination, incentives, risk sharing. 
 
1  Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increase in the use of contract production in Danish agriculture. 
This development has made the understanding of contract production more topical. It is therefore 
interesting to take a deeper look into a specific contract in order to analyze how different problems 
general to agricultural production contracts have been solved. This paper is part of a larger survey 
of the contract production in Danish agriculture
1. The aim of the survey is to provide guidelines for 
design of contracts in agricultural production and to develop economic analysis of the existing 
contracts.  
 
The contract between Danisco Foods and farmers concerning the production of green peas has evol-
ved through many years of experience. The major motivation behind the contract for pea production 
is the need to control the timing of harvesting.  
 
The contract has to solve two fundamental problems. The first problem is what the literature refers 
to as moral hazard. The problem exists because the actions taken by the farmer are unobservable to 
                                                 
1 The Norma and Frode Jacobsen Foundation sponsor the project.  
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Danisco Foods, so that the farmer chooses actions to maximize his own utility without considering 
the effects on Danisco Foods. This creates a need for incentives motivating the farmers to provide 
effort in such a way that the return of Danisco Foods is maximized. Moral hazard is a problem due 
to the risk aversity of the farmers as well as to complexities of contract writing and c osts of 
monitoring. If the farmers were not risk averse, the moral hazard issue could be solved by making 
the farmers residual claimants. The other problem is screening, i.e. the problem of designing a 
contract that attracts the farmers with high alternative income options without paying too much to 
farmers with low alternative income options. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background in the industry. Section 3 
describes the most important regulations in the contract. Section 4 analyses how general challenges 
such as moral hazard, risk sharing and screening is solved in the contract, furthermore this section 




Danisco Foods has been involved in green pea production for at least 50 years. Danisco Foods 
processes peas produced on 4,100 hectares, and is the sole processor of green peas in Denmark. The 
peas are processed in two factories owned by Danisco Foods. The green peas are sold in different 
mixes of frozen vegetables to supermarket chains in Denmark and other European countries. There 
is a very small export of bulk. Danisco Foods experiences competition from foreign companies, 
mainly because about 60 per cent of the production is exported, but also because other companies 
sell in the Danish market. The impression within the industry is that the competition is tough due to 
over-capacity on the European market for frozen peas. 
 
The timing of the harvesting is extremely important to the final outcome. If the peas are harvested 
too late, they will be too ripe to be used as green peas, whereas if they are harvested too soon, the 
yield is too low. This means that the harvesting must be done within an interval of 24 hours. Once 
the peas have been harvested they must be frozen within 4 hours to remain fresh. 
 
These factors require a very accurate planning, since the harvesting must be coordinated according 
to the capacity in the factory, the capacity of the harvesting machines, transportation time and the 
ripeness of the peas. To obtain an efficient harvesting process, the decision-making is centralized. 
This implies that Danisco Foods controls all decisions made during the harvesting period. In order 
to plan the harvesting, the sowing must also be done in the right order. To ensure this, the individual 
sowing time of each field is also decided by Danisco Foods. The main motivation behind the con-
tract is the issue of timing the harvesting. 
 
For most farmers the contract production is a one-year relationship, since farmers can easily change 
their production plans and exclude peas from their production. Furthermore, peas can only be grown 
                                                 
2 The description in this section is mainly based on an interview of the Senior Field Manager at Danisco Foods referred 
to as (Sørensen, 1998). Another important source is an interview of the Board and Secretary of The Growers Associa-
tion (Growers Association, 1998). This paper describes the situation before Danisco Ltd. sold Danisco Foods in 2000.  
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on the same area once every six years due to biological factors. For these reason the contract is a 
one-year contract where the terms are adjusted every year. However, some farmers produce peas on 
contract year after year in different fields. 
 
The producers are organized in The Growers Association. This is, however, a quite weak organi-
zation, since it has no means to enforce discipline. Danisco Foods has a large number of potential 
growers. If the association made a threat that no grower would sign the contract, Danisco Foods 
would be able to either go elsewhere or start signing contracts with the growers on an individual 
basis. This actually happened in 1996, when the association rejected the contract (Growers Asso-
ciation, 1998). Danisco Foods is the only buyer of green peas from Danish farmers and thus holds 
almost all the bargaining power. 
 
Danisco Foods considers the existence of The Growers Association an advantage, because it redu-
ces the transaction cost (it is cheaper to write just one contract). A large part of the farmers are not 
able to see through the contract, these farmers only sign the contract because they have confidence 
in their negotiators. This means that the acceptance of the contract from The Growers Association is 
as a necessary blue stamping of the contract. Having the contract rejected by the Association would 
be bad publicity for the firm. Furthermore the relation with The Growers Association shifts the con-
tract relationship towards more long-term commitment
3. These factors give the Growers Associa-
tion some bargaining power which is used to reduce Danisco Foods’ flexibility in contract design, 
and thereby the possibilities for Danisco Foods to discriminate between farmers of different types
4. 
This issue is analyzed in section 5.  
 
2.1  Chronology 
The chronology of the process is: 
-  Negotiation between The Growers Association and Danisco Foods 
-  Farmers communicate the size of the areas they want to allocate to contract production of 
peas to Danisco Foods – this is not legally binding.  
-  Contract is completed based on negotiation between Danisco Foods and The Growers 
Association. 
-  Danisco Foods sends out the standard contract on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis to each farmer 
-  Farmers decide to sign or to reject the contract, and select the area for pea production 
-  Danisco Foods inspects the fields offered by the farmers and chooses their contractees based 
on the inspection 
-  Danisco Foods decides on the production plan, i.e. who, where and when 
-  Farmers make soil preparations and complete the sowing 
                                                 
3 A long-term relationship reduces the risk of opportunism, see Williamson (1985). 
4 The growers argue for the use of only one contract from a fairness point of view, demanding ex ante equal treatment 
of all farmers.   
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-  Farmers are divided into groups 
-  Farmers provide plant protection 
-  Danisco Foods harvest the crop 
-  Payment 
 
3  The contract
5 
The farmer provides the land and is responsible for the soil preparations, the sowing and the plant 
protection during the growing season. Danisco Foods decides the timing of sowing, provides 
advisory service, and accomplish the harvesting. Danisco Foods does not only decide when the 
sowing must be done but also which varieties to use and how much seed to use. 
 
In order to control the amount of seed used, Danisco Foods charges a very high price for using too 
much. For the farmer Danisco Foods is his only access to seed. These two factors control the quan-
tity of seed effectively.  
 
To provide documentation to customers that, for a limited time before harvesting, there has been no 
use of pesticides on the peas, Danisco Foods requests the farmers to keep a log of their work. 
 
Danisco Foods has the right to decide that a farmer must try out a new variety on a small area. In 
these cases the farmer is paid according to the regular payment scheme, but with a guarantee that he 
will get at least the same payment per hectare for the new variety as he obtains for the ordinary va-
riety on the rest of his land. I.e. the payment follows an option structure
6 with weaker incentives to 
the farmers, which may lead to conflicts of interest. However, Danisco Foods has never experienced 
any problems with farmers sowing new variety on the poorest land or undertaking an otherwise 
more risky production of a new variety. 
 
Danisco Foods can refuse to accept peas from a farmer if, due to shirk, the peas cannot be used in 
production. Except from damages caused by hail
7, the peas are never refused for reasons outside the 
influence of the farmers
8. 
 
The payment is determined in two steps. First the payment on factory level is determined, i.e. the 
total bill Danisco Foods must pay the farmers. Danisco Foods pays 1.40 DKK/kg. for the first 5500 
                                                 
5 The division of obligations described in the following is based on Danisco Foods (1998) and Growers Association 
(1998). 
6 The payment to the farmer only depends on output if the yield on the new variety exceeds a certain level. This 
corresponds to the payment of a financial option. 
7 Most of the farmers have already insured their entire crop against damages from hail. 
8 This corresponds to what in the contract theory is known as moving support, since both sides agree that peas never are 
rejected  due to bad luck. The idea is that shirking can be avoided at no cost, if the punishment is harsh enough and if it 
is possible to detect shirking without any miscarriage of justice (Salanié, 1997).  
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kg./hectare and 0.55 DKK/kg. for the remaining quantity. The farmers are guarantied a minimum of 














Figure Error! Unknown switch argument. The factory payment 
 
The farmers are divided into groups according to the variety sowed and the time of sowing. This 
means that farmers in the same group experience the same growing conditions. The average pay-
ment is the same in all groups. In each group the total payment is shared proportionally to the far-
mers production. And with a minimum payment of 4800 DKK per hectare, the individual farmer is 
facing a linear price scheme
9. The following figure shows the payment scheme towards a farmer in 
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Figure Error! Unknown switch argument. The payment to a farmer 
 
As shown in the figure, the average production in the group is very important to the farmer. This 
makes the division of the groups an interesting issue, which will be discussed later.  
 
If Danisco Foods is unable to harvest the peas at the right time, the company has the right to decide 
which areas will not be harvested as green peas but at full ripeness. The payment to the farmer is 
                                                 
9 In this graph the effect of an increase in the production of one farmer on the total factory payment and on the average 
production in his group is not included.  
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not affected by this decision, i.e. Danisco Foods bears all risk derived from timing in the harvesting 
period. 
 
The contract specifies that conflicts are to be solved by an arbitrator. 
 
4  Analysis of the contract 
The following provides an analysis of how different general challenges such as coordination, hold-
up, risk sharing, moral hazard and screening are solved in the contract.  
 
4.1  Coordination 
The production of green peas requires precise coordination of the different levels in the production. 
In this contract the coordination is reached through a very centralized decision-making, where 
Danisco Foods decides: 
-  Who to accept as producers 
-  The variety 
-  The amount of seed  
-  The timing of sowing and harvesting 
-  The production standards 
 
The programmability of the farmer’s tasks is quite high, and the areas are inspected 3-4 times 
during the growing season. This gives Danisco Foods a high degree of control over the entire pro-
duction process.  
 
4.2  Hold-up 
Danisco Foods has made very specific investments in this production, including investments in the 
factories and in the harvesting equipment. In a different context this could lead to hold-up problems, 
but since Danisco Foods has so many potential contractees, there is no real risk of hold-up. 
 
The growers do not make any investments. There are no requirements for special machines or any 
special training, since peas is a very easy crop to grow. This eliminates the risk of Danisco Foods 
holding up the farmers. 
 
4.3  Risk sharing 
Risk sharing between the parties is in general an important issue in contract design. The general 
idea in agency theory is that the principal (Danisco Foods) has a weaker risk aversion than the agent 
(the farmer). In the present case, Danisco Foods is risk averse (Sørensen, 1998). However, several 
arguments suggest that insurance against risk is cheaper for Danisco Foods than it is for the farmers. 
Firstly, Danisco Foods has six other product lines and therefore a high diversification. Secondly, 
Danisco Foods is only one division of a larger corporation Danisco A/S, thus giving the owners  
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opportunity to diversify their investments on the capital market. It is difficult for the farmers to 
diversify due to correlation between the yields of different crops, and their opportunities of diver-
sification through capital investments are also limited. Thus, it is to be expected that it is cheaper 
for Danisco Foods to bear the risk than it is for the farmers. 
 
In dividing the risk between Danisco Foods and the farmers there is a trade-off between optimal risk 
sharing, i.e. placing the entire risk on the party who can handle risk the cheapest, and the provision 
of incentives. An optimal risk sharing would be to pay the farmers a fixed wage, but this will not 
motivate the farmers to provide effort. 
 
4.3.1  Sources of risk 
In the analysis of risk sharing it is important to look at the types of risk in the production chain.  
One major distinction is between general and individual risk. 
 
Following the division in Holmström  (1982) the production risk can be separated into general 
production risk and idiosyncratic risk. In the production of green peas the general production risk is 
the risk caused by weather conditions, general vermin attacks etc. The idiosyncratic risk is associa-
ted with those risk factors that affect the farmers differently such as plant disease, weeds etc. 
 
In this production, not all farmers experience the same general production risk, since the time of 
sowing and the variety of peas determine the output. This means that the general risk is primarily 
comparable only between farmers in the same group. 
 
If it is cheaper for the company to bear the risk than it is for the farmers, the company should take 
all risk except some fraction of the idiosyncratic risk, which the farmer must bear for incentive 
reasons (Holmström, 1982). 
 
4.3.2  Risk borne by Danisco Foods 
The payment from Danisco Foods to the farmers is independent of marketing possibilities, i.e. the 
company bears all price risk
10. From the beginning of the harvesting period Danisco Foods bears all 
risk associated with the production, since the company faces the loss if an area is not harvested as 
green peas but at full ripeness. With these decisions being outside the influence of the farmers, this 
is exactly what the contract theory predicts, since there is no trade-off between risk sharing and 
incentives. 
 
As earlier mentioned, the farmers are guaranteed a minimum payment of 4,800 DKK per hectare, 
implying that Danisco Foods bears the general production risk of very low yields. The second break 
in the factory-payment curve implies that Danisco Foods bears some additional part of the general 
production risk, since variations in the output on the last part of the payment curve only have a 
                                                 
10 One can argue that the farmers bear some marketing risk, since their contracts will not be renewed if the production is 
no longer profitable to Danisco Foods.  
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minor effect on the payment (see figure 1)
11. If the farmers had to take all the general production 
risk, the factory payment would be determined by a constant price per kg. On the other hand, if the 
factory payment were independent of the output, Danisco Foods would bear all general production 
risk. The later system would correspond to the payment scheme in the American broiler production 





Danisco Foods bears all general production risk
Farmers bear all general production risk,




Figure 3 Different ways to deal with common risk by variations in factory payment 
  
If the risk is borne cheapest by Danisco Foods, the system with the flat payment would dominate 
the payment scheme in the present contract since the company will gain from insuring producers 
against the general production risk, thus obtaining the farmers risk premium. The figure shows how 
the payment for the expected production Y
* is lower the more risk Danisco Foods bears, since this 
reduces the risk premium to the farmers. This is one of the important arguments in favor of using 
tournaments in broiler contracts (Knoeber, 1989).  
 
If the general production risk is severe, it may cause financial problems for the integrator to bear 
general production risk in bad years. This problem is analyzed by Tsoulouhas and Vukina (1999). 
They explain the coexistence of contracts based on relative performance evaluation and contracts 
based on fixed performance standards in different agricultural industries, using the argument of 
integrator bankruptcy. They argue that farmers do not accept contracts, if the payments provided 
cannot be recovered from the firms’ revenue and liquidation value in bad y ears. The empirical 
evidence supports this, since tournaments are not used in industries with high common risk. The 
problem of possible bankruptcy may explain the actual contract between Danisco Foods and the 
farmers. 
 
                                                 
11 The kink in the payment scheme can alternatively be explained from a coordination point of view, since it gives wea-
ker incentives to the farmers in good seasons. If the marginal value of the peas produced decreases in the quantity pro-
duced, it is reasonable to reduce the level of effort if the production is already high.  
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There is a conflict of interest between the farmers and Danisco Foods regarding the production 
planning. Overall, Danisco Foods wants the harvesting period to be as long as possible in order to 
utilize the capacity at the factory. For this reason Danisco Foods wants to have some farmers 
sowing very early and some sowing very late even though this results in lower yields. Contrary to 
this, the farmers want to choose the sowing time such that the yields are maximized and do not take 
the factorycapacity problems into consideration. If Danisco Foods tells one group of farmers to sow 
at a bad time, the total payment to farmers decreases. This means that Danisco Foods pays only part 
of the costs caused by production planning (i.e. the time of sowing and the variety of seed). This in 
turn implies that Danisco Foods does not have incentives to plan the production in a way that 
maximizes the total vertical profit. A flat payment scheme would place all costs of production 
planning on Danisco Foods, thus eliminating the conflict of interest between Danisco Foods and the 
farmers regarding the time of sowing
12. Since the loss caused by sowing at a bad time is shared 
between all farmers, the individual farmer has very little incentive to object to decisions made by 
Danisco Foods. Thus Danisco Foods can implement a production plan without too much protest.  
 
If Danisco Foods were to take all common risk, it may lead to conflict with the Danish agricultural 
law. The Danish agricultural law requires that the risk of production is taken by the farmer (Wulf 
and Jørgensen, 1995)
13. This means that even the present contract may not be legal, since the indi-
vidual farmer does not bear all the production risk
14. The legal aspects of the contract will not be 
analyzed further. 
 
4.3.3  Risk shared among all farmers 
The part of risk not borne by Danisco Foods is either shared between all farmers via pooling or 
borne by the individual farmer. As mentioned, Danisco Foods bears only part of the common 
production risk, since the factory payment is not constant. This leaves a fraction of the common 
production risk to the farmers. The farmers bear not only part of the common risk such as a dry 
season, but also a fraction of that risk, which is only common to the farmers within one group, such 
as bad weather at the time of sowing. This comes from the fact that a low production in one group 
lowers the factory payment, but the farmers in the low yielding group receive the same average 
payment as the other groups.  
 
New varieties are introduced in a way that causes no additional risk to the individual farmer, since 
Danisco Foods guarantees at least the same payment per hectare as for the ordinary varieties. How-
ever the total payment from Danisco Foods to the farmers will decrease if a new variety has very 
low yields, since the total production will drop. This means that Danisco Foods is both giving and 
taking, if a new variety has low yields. The net effect can be both positive and negative. 
 
                                                 
12 There may still exist some conflict of interest if the variability is affected by the time of sowing. 
13 The argument is that arrangements where the farmers do not bear the full production risk is considered a rental 
arrangement. 
14 The contract protects the farmer from production risk in several ways. Danisco Foods bears all the risk of harvesting, 
and the risk of a bad sowing time etc. is shifted from the individual farmer to all farmers (see next section).  
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4.3.4  Risk borne by the individual farmer 
Another source of risk is the division of farmers into groups, since the payment to the individual 
farmer depends on the performance of the other farmers in his group. The payment to a farmer is 
therefore determined by how the groups are divided. If we look at the farmer in figure 2 with same 
yield as the average for all farmers (7,500 kg. per hectare), his payment will vary from 7,300 to 
11,000 DKK per hectare as the average production in his group varies from 6,000 to 9,000 kg per 
hectare. This shows that from a risk perspective the division into groups is important. The group 
division is not arbitrary, but determined by which variety the farmer grows. This means that most of 
the difference in yields across the groups is common to all farmers within one group (i.e. the frac-
tion of deviation caused by difference in yields for different varieties). The larger the groups, the 
smaller the risk from group division
15 due to the law of large numbers. 
 
The payment on farm level is dependent on idiosyncratic risks in order to provide the farmer 
incentives to perform. 
 
The farmer bears the risk of severe weed problems that occur only if the farmer shirks on the plant 
protection. This is supported by the argument of moving support from the contract theory (see note 
8). 
 
4.4  Moral hazard 
The production of peas involves a large number of production decisions. This makes it difficult to 
specify and monitor the tasks of the farmers. It is therefore important to provide incentives for the 
farmers to perform in such a way that their hidden action maximizes the profit of Danisco Foods. 
Possibilities for opportunistic behavior exist on both sides. 
 
4.4.1  Opportunistic behavior from Danisco Foods  
The negotiation process makes it important for Danisco Foods to maintain a good relationship with 
The Growers Association. This limits Danisco Foods possibilities to exploit market power. 
 
In a year where Danisco Foods foresees very bad marketing conditions, the company would be inte-
rested in reducing the quantity. The contract in principle gives Danisco Foods certain ways to do 
this. The company can reject more peas and blame it on e.g. weed, but the arbitrator institution and 
the importance of the relationship with The Growers Association minimizes such behavior. Another 
possibility would be to harvest a larger part of the peas at ripeness instead of as green peas. This 
approach is very expensive, since the value of ripe peas is much lower than the payment to the far-
mers. Thus, using time of harvest as an instrument in controlling the quantity is too expensive. This 
means that on the side of Danisco Foods the contract does not give rise to moral hazard. 
 
                                                 
15 I.e. risk caused by the production level in the group.  
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4.4.2  Opportunistic behavior from the farmers 
Low effort on the farmer’s side is a fundamental moral hazard issue in this contract. Since it is 
impossible to specify and monitor the task of the farmers, an incentive contract is used as 
governance structure.  
 
The farmers are quite limited in their set of possible production decisions. This means that in reality 
they are unable to affect the quality of the peas, since Danisco Foods decides the variety, the 
amount of seed and the production standards. For this reason quality is not a moral hazard issue in 
the production.  
 
A problem in the use of tournaments is that the agents have incentives to collude in providing low 
effort. This problem is solved in two ways. Firstly, the farmer cannot know with whom to collude 
until after he has provided most of his effort, since the groups are not divided until after the sowing. 
Secondly, the groups change from year to year i.e. the farmers do not get to know each other. The 
disadvantage of not knowing the group before signing the contract is that the farmer can have only a 
very uncertain expectation concerning his payment, because he does not know whether he ends up 
in a group with high or low average yield. 
 
4.5  Screening 
The farmers have to be compensated for their effort and the land they provide. The farmers are paid 
according to their production, regardless of whether a high production is a result of high effort or 
high soil quality. When calculating which soil types Danisco Foods wants to contract upon, the 
company considers all cost, i.e. the payment to farmers as well as the production cost. One example 
of such considerations is that good soil with high yields gives relatively cheaper harvesting and 
better timing (the fixed cost of harvesting an area – transportation cost of machinery to the area etc. 
is apportioned to a larger quantity). Such considerations suggest that it is most profitable for 
Danisco Foods to sign contracts with the farmers holding the best soil even though they have a 
higher reservation value
16  (Sørensen, 1998). It is therefore in the interest of Danisco Foods to 
design a contract rewarding the farmers with good soil to at least compensate their potential profit 
in production of other crops. 
 
The total area contracted for is limited by the factory capacity. In an efficient setting, Danisco Foods 
will sign contracts on the areas with the largest difference between marginal value of the area to 
Danisco Foods and the reservation value. Danisco Foods does have contracts on the best soil. This 
fact allows us to infer that the difference between the reservation value and the value to Danisco 
Foods is increasing in soil quality (Sørensen, 1998).  
 
The following figures analyze how soil quality affects the payment under the present contract and 
under modified contracts. We assume that the production follows the simple structure without risk 
i i i s a y + = , where  i y  is the output for farmer i,  i a  is his level of effort and  i s  his soil quality
17. 
                                                 
16 The reservation value is the income the farmer can obtain in an alternative production. 
17 The soil quality does not follow ordinary measures of soil quality, it is a measure normalized for our purpose.  
  12   
Furthermore we suppress the effort a in the figure by graphing the output for a soil type at the 
optimal level of effort. We assume that the soil quality is uniformly distributed. Since the payment 
per hectare is given by the yield times the price per kg. in the group
18, the payment is, under our 
assumptions, linear in soil quality. Every year Danisco Foods rejects some farmers, with low quality 
soil, who want to contract. This is because the payment to farmers with low quality soil is above 
their reservation value. It is hardest for Danisco Foods to attract the farmers with the best soils. We 
can infer from this information, that the reservation value must be convex in soil quality
19.  
 










y 1 y max y
 
Figure 4 The payment to different soil types in the present contract 
 
where B is the information rent to the farmers and A is the profit to Danisco Foods. 
 
According to the figure, it will be most profitable for Danisco Foods to utilize the capacity by 
signing contracts upon the soil types between  1 y  and  max y . If Danisco Foods offers payment as 
shown in the graph, all farmers are interested in a contract. However, Danisco Foods prefers soil 
types above  1 y  and is not at all interested in soil types below  y . Danisco Foods has many years of 
experience in the industry and has a reasonable knowledge of the soil type based on the geographi-
cal location of the area. For this reason it is fair to assume that the company is able to detect and 
reject the types below  1 y . This means that the problem of screening in this contact does not come 
from  hidden information as in the standard adverse selection problems, but is caused by the 
limitation of having only one contract , i.e. a contract independent of soil types. 
 
The figure above shows that since Danisco Foods is unable to make efficient discrimination towards 
the farmers, the farmers obtain the profit in area B. Danisco Foods could discriminate by changing 
                                                 
18 We also assume that the individual farmer do not affect the price per kg. in his group. 
19 The explanation for this is that the soil quality has relatively more effect on the yield of alternative crops than on the 
production of peas. Formally the argument requires that the reservation value of land without any potential yield is zero 
and that the second order derivative has the same sign everywhere. The appendix contains an example of production 
functions leading to convex reservation value.  
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the payment into an affine payment, in which the farmers receive a fixed premium for the quality of 









Payment to farmer 
with low quality soil
Payment to farmer 
with high quality soil
Y
* Y max Y  
Figure 5 Differentiated payment to soil types based on bonuses 
 
As illustrated in the figure above, offering a constant price per kilo combined with a bonus to soil 
types above Y
* increases the profit to Danisco Foods (area A in the figure) and reduces the profits to 
the producers (area B)
20. The contract suggested in the figure above is not a self-selection device, 
where the farmer himself chooses which contract he prefers, but a system where Danisco Foods 
offers each farmer just one contract. The figure below shows a set of contracts fulfilling the 
individual rationality constraint. The difference between the figures is that in the latter the price is 
used to discriminate, whereas the discrimination in the first figure is created by bonuses alone. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The payment per kilo in the affine payment in the figure is lower than the originally payment, which reduces the 
incentives. The information rent to farmers could also be reduced by using the originally payment per kilo in figure 4 to 
high quality soil combined with a negative bonus to low quality soil.  
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Value to Danisco Foods
Reservation value
DKK per hectare
A Payment to farmer 
with low quality soil
Payment to farmer 
with high quality soil
Soil quality
Y
* Y max Y  
Figure 6  Differentiated payment to soil types based on different prices
21 
 
The analysis shows the dilemma for Danisco Foods. If the company wants to contract upon the best 
soils, and in order to do so pay these farmers a high price, farmers with lower yields will benefit by 
receiving a payment that exceeds their reservation value (since the company is restricted to only one 
contract). This is similar to the problem of the company raising the payment to obtain the 
advantages of large areas per farmer (to reduce transportation of the harvesting machines) and 
thereby increasing the benefit of all other farmers. It would be beneficial for Danisco Foods to 
discriminate the farmers by using bonuses for high quality soil, large areas per farm and location 
near the factory. However, the farmers resist this because it would remove their profits. This result 
corresponds to the actual negotiation process, where The Growers Association has blocked the use 
of bonus payment to farmers with large areas (Growers Association, 1998). 
 
The payment per kg. in the group is determined by the factory payment and the average yield in the 
group. This causes a serious problem, since the soil-quality within one group tends to be positively 
correlated, since the groups are divided according to the harvesting route, so that the farmers in one 
group are from the same area. The consequence is that the payment per hectare to farmers in a 
group with high quality land is close to factory payment per hectare, because of a low price per kilo 
in the group
22.  Thus, the way in which the groups are divided causes these farmers to profit more 
from growing other crops. If Danisco Foods still wants to contract upon the best soils, the factory 
payment will have to be raised. This turns out to be too costly for the company, and as a result there 
has not been any contracts during the past few years in a certain area with very good soil (Sørensen, 
1998). 
 
If the payment were dependent on information about the soil type, the contract could be improved 
in yet two other ways. Firstly, the current contract design may lead to a deadweight loss. In the 
figure below the total profit of Danisco Foods increases (Danisco Foods looses DF-1 but gains DF-
                                                 
21 This approach may influence the level of input, meaning that the rescaling of soil type may not be valid, because the 
assumption  a ai =  may be broken. 
22 In figure 4 this corresponds to a concave payment scheme from Danisco Foods.  
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2) if Danisco Foods lowers the payment to the farmers. Lowering the price to the farmers means 
that the contract is no longer acceptable for the best soils (between y2 and ymax), thus Danisco Foods 
will contact on the soils between y0 and y2. Lowering the payment to the farmers is however not 
socially optimal, since the total profit of farmers and Danisco Foods is reduced. The problem is 
even more serious if the soil types are not uniformly distributed as assumed in figure 4, since a 
payment aimed at a small area of very high soil quality benefits all other soil types. 
 
Soil quality














Figur 7 Deadweight loss due to uniform payment scheme 
 
The second way for information about soil quality to improve the contract is through more exact 
information about the effort. The idea is that the output level conditioned on the soil type contains 
more information about the effort, which makes the implementation less costly (Holmström, 1979). 
 
The information about soil quality may not be verifiable. In a situation where the company has 
committed to a constant total payment
23 to the farmers, the non-verifiable information is not an 
issue, since Danisco Foods has no incentives to misrepresent the information, see Bogetoft (1994) 
for a general analysis of the use of non-verifiable information in contracts. 
 
Given these advantages of conditioning the payment on the soil type, the Coasian Theorem sug-
gests, that the parties would reach a Pareto optimal agreement through negotiation and divide the 
benefits via side payments. One reason why the Coasian Theorem may not hold is that the farmers 
negotiating the present contract may not be accepted as growers in a contract based on soil types. It 
may not be possible for Danisco Foods to compensate these farmers via side payments, which 
causes the negotiations to break down. 
 
                                                 
23 Danisco Foods could commit to categorizing e.g. 50 per cent of the area as high quality.  
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4.6  How should the groups be divided? 
The payment scheme makes the division of groups very important. As mentioned, the price scheme 
is not totally linear toward the farmers, since an increase in the production of one farmer has two 
second order effects. Firstly, a higher production raises the payment on factory level and thereby the 
payment to the groups. Secondly, a higher production lowers the payment per kg. in the group. 
 
The payment from Danisco Foods is independent of group division, but the incentives and alloca-
tion of the payment depends on the formation of the groups
24. Danisco Foods is interested in fields 
as large as possible, since this reduces the transportation time of the harvesting machines. In this 
matter the incentives does not support the interests of Danisco Foods, because the incentives are 
weaker the larger the area of the farmer. Since a farmer by producing more lowers the payment per 
kg. in the group due to a higher average production, the individual farmer affects the group average 
more the smaller the group is. I. e. the larger the group, the more high-powered the incentives to the 
individual farmer. This, of course, affects farmers with large productions (due to large areas or high 
yields) the most. Thus, the incentives are lower the larger the farm size or the higher the yields. 
These results are shown in the appendix. 
 
The effects of group size on the incentive structure as well as the effect on risk caused by produc-
tion level within the group (see section 4.3.4) give arguments for large groups, which is in line with 
the policy of the company. However, the farmers are still divided into a considerable number of 
groups. There are two reasons for this. First, the farmers are divided into groups based on which 
variety of seed they have. In this way, comparing low yielding varieties to high yielding varieties is 
avoided.  This is basically a fairness argument. This argument does not by itself explain the 
groupdivision, since this objective could be reached by using different premiums based on experi-
mental results to the different varieties
25. The second motivation for dividing into more groups is to 
obtain a more precise measure of the common uncertainty in each group, since farmers sowing at 
different times are affected differently by the weather conditions. This means that the division of 
groups should be done according to the trade-off between strong incentives and precise measures of 
common uncertainty. 
 
4.7  Modification of the payment scheme 
It is unfortunate if incentives are very dependent on the groupsize and are weaker for larger produ-
cers. Usually, Relative Performance Evaluation is made by comparing the output of one agent with 
the average of other agents who face the same common uncertainty, i.e. the agents own output is not 
included in the average used for comparison (Schleifer, 1985). In the appendix it is shown that 
                                                 
24 If Danisco Foods use the group division as a discrimination mechanism rewarding growers with high reservation 
value, Danisco Foods can attract all growers using a lower factory payment. In this case the factory payment depends on 
the division of groups.  
25 This approach has actually been tried out by Danisco Foods by offering different prices to the varieties. The prices 
were determined before the signing of the contracts. This system was abandoned because it resulted in too much varia-
tion in the payment (Sørensen, 1998).  
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(under the assumption that the payment from Danisco Foods is constant
26) such a modification will 
mean that: 
-  The payment per kg. to a farmer is independent of his yield 
-  The incentives are independent of group size 
-  The incentives are independent of farm size. 
 
The effect of such a modification in the payment scheme is analyzed on the basis of data for the 111 
farmers supplying Danisco Foods in 1996. A comparison between the actual payment and the 
payment the farmers would obtain, were their own production not included in the group average, 
shows that the modification of the payment scheme has only minor effects on the payment to the 
farmers
27. The largest deviation between the payments in the two systems is 7 per cent. In figure 8 
the payment the farmers would obtain in a modified system (vertical axis) is plotted against the 
current payment (horizontal axis). The figure shows that in general the farmers receiving the highest 
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Payment under modified system, 
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Current payment, kr. per hectare  
Figur 8 The payment to farmers under current and modified system. 
 
Even though the payments to the farmers remain almost unchanged, a modification of the payment 
scheme would lead to a large increase in the incentives. Figure 9 shows the current marginal 
income
28 plotted against the marginal income in the modified system. The largest increase of 
incentives is 115 per cent and is obtained by a farmer in a small group. The incentives increase for 
all farmers, even though the effect in larger groups is minor. 
 
 
                                                 
26 See the discussion on page 6 of optimal risk sharing. 
27 Changes in level of production may alter this; the analysis is based on the old production levels. 
28 The marginal income is the increase in payment from an increase in production of 1 kg. per hectare  










0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60
Curent marginal price, kr. per kg.
Marginal price under modified system, 
kr. per kg.
 
Figur 9 The incentives under current and modified system 
 
The total payment to farmers is 0.25 per cent higher in the modified system than in the current 
system. This is caused by positive correlation between farm size and yields. This shows that the 
large farms would have stronger incentives than small farms under the modified contract, which is 
in line with the interest of Danisco Foods due to lower harvesting cost on large areas. The 
disadvantage of the modified system is that the payment to the individual farmer becomes more 
sensitive to variation in the yields of other producers. 
 
5  Conclusion 
The major motivation behind the contract is the issue of coordinating the production in the harve-
sting period. This crucial coordination is obtained through centralized decision-making, where 
Danisco Foods makes all major decisions regarding the production. 
 
There are no hold-up problems in the contract. Danisco Foods do have some specific investments, 
but the growers have very little bargaining power and are unable to hold up Danisco Foods. There 
are no specific investments on the growers’ side.  
 
The payment to the individual farmer is determined through tournaments. However, this does not 
cause any problems of collusion, since the farmers do not know with whom to collude until after the 
sowing when most of their work is done. 
 
There is a high programmability of the farmers’ tasks. This implies that Danisco Foods can ensure 
some level of effort via monitoring. The use of incentives to motivate the farmers to provide effort 
plays a very important role.  
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The payment to the farmers is determined in two steps. First, the total payment from Danisco Foods 
to all farmers is determined, based on the actual average yield per hectare. Secondly, the farmers are 
divided into groups according to the time of sowing. The average payment per hectare is the same 
in all groups. In each group the payment is divided proportionally to the quantity of peas supplied 
by each farmer. 
 
Danisco Foods bears all the price risk but only a small part of the production risk. From a theoreti-
cal point of view this seems to be disadvantageous, since several arguments point towards Danisco 
Foods being the cheapest risk bearer. In order to shift all general production risk towards Danisco 
Foods it is suggested that the total payment from Danisco Foods to farmers is made independent of 
the actual production level. This corresponds to the system used in American broiler contracts. The 
advantage of this risk sharing is that Danisco Foods can obtain the risk premium from the farmers 
by insuring them against general production risk. Another advantage of a fixed total payment is that 
it minimizes conflicts of interest between the farmers and Danisco Foods regarding the production 
plan. 
 
It would be beneficial for Danisco Foods to discriminate between farmers by offering different 
contracts based on soil types. The present system does not use any bonuses, as a result of The 
Growers Association bargaining power. This reduces the profit of Danisco Foods and may lead to 
deadweight losses. 
 
By dividing the farmers into groups and paying them according to the group’s average price per kg., 
the contract actually uses Relative Performance Evaluation. When the average production in the 
group is calculated, all farmers in the group are included. This paper shows that the incentives 
would improve if the average production to which the farmers were compared did not include the 
farmer in question. Calculation on actual data for 1996 shows that this, for some farmers, would 
increase the incentives by more than 100 per cent. 
 
6  Appendix 
6.1  Convex reservation value 
We look at the simple production function for peas:  s y p = , s is the soil quality and  y is the 
production level. The production function for the alternative crop is 
2 s yA = . We look at the interval 
1 0 £ £ s , and the price of the alternative crop is  1 = A P . Danisco Foods is aiming at the lowest price 
on peas  p P  satisfying: 
s P s P
s s P
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If Danisco Foods wants to contract upon all soil types, it must choose  1 Pp =   . 












6.2  The contract 
Let  i x  denote the area on farm i=1,…,N, and let  i q  be the total production on farm i. We analyze 
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where  J X  denotes the total area in group J,  N X  the total area for all farmers and  J Q  is the total 
production in group J. 
 
The payment B to farmer t in group J is: 
J t Jt p q B =  
 





















p =  we have: 
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3 2 1 43 42 1
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The marginal payment is given by the payment per kg. in the group plus the share of the change in 
factory payment minus farmer t’s share of price reduction in the group. The latter because a farmer 
by raising his production also increases the total production of his group, and thereby lowers the 
price per kg. within the group. 
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£ , i.e. the farmers face lower incentives than the average payment per kg in their group. 
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t \  be the production for all other producers in group J but producer t, and let 
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 decreases in  t y , i.e. the incentives are weaker the higher the yield 
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 increases in  J X , i.e. the incentives are stronger in large groups 
 
6.3  Modified contract 
We now consider a modification of the contract, where the individual farmer is excluded from the 
average in the group, when the price per kg is determined. I.e. we change the payment to farmer t in 
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The incentives in this contract is: 
 
4 4 3 4 4 2 1
payment factory   

















































 is independent of  t q . 
 
A further modification of the contract, resulting in a constant payment from Danisco Foods (due to 
risk consideration, see page 8) i.e.  0 =
dq
dF







=  are independent 
of  
•  The farmers own yield  
•  Farm size  
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